Authors: Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein, Don A. Moore
Publication: Journal of Consumer Research, February 2011
Abstract: Disclosure is often proposed as a remedy for conﬂicts of interest, but it can backﬁre, hurting those whom it is intended to protect. Building on our prior research, we introduce a conceptual model of disclosure’s effects on advisors and advice recipients that helps to explain when and why it backﬁres. Studies 1 and 2 examine psychological mechanisms (strategic exaggeration, moral licensing) by which disclosure can lead advisors to give more-biased advice. Study 3 shows that disclosure backﬁres when advice recipients who receive disclosure fail to sufficiently discount and thus fail to mitigate the adverse effects of disclosure on advisor bias. Study 4 identiﬁes one remedy for inadequate discounting of biased advice: explicitly and simultaneously contrasting biased advice with unbiased advice.